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Abstract 
 
The public funding of long-term care (LTC) programs to support the frail elderly is 
still underdeveloped compared to other areas of social protection for old age. In 
Europe, any moves to broaden entitlements to LTC are impeded by increasing 
demand for care coinciding with constrained public finances. We examine a set of 
conditions that facilitate modifications to the financial entitlement to LTC and 
elaborate the concept of ‘implicit partnerships’: an implicit (or ‘silent’) agreement, 
encompassing the financial co-participation of public funders and the time and/or 
financial resources of users and their families. We argue that the successful building 
of ‘implicit partnerships’ opens the door to potential reform of financial entitlements, 
either through ‘user partnerships’ relying on users’ co-payments, or ‘caregiver 
partnerships’ relying on informal care provision. We examine entitlements over time 
in seven European countries; the EU-5, the Netherlands and Sweden. Furthermore, we 
show that public attitudes towards financing and provision of LTC support the 
country specific financial entitlements and the type of implicit partnership we identify. 
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Building ‘Implicit Partnerships’?  
Financial Long Term Care Entitlements in 
Europe 
 
 
Introduction 
Long-term care (LTC) for older people refers to personal and nursing care 
services designed to provide support in essential aspects of daily living. 1 
Currently, increasing demand due to demographic and social changes – 
population ageing and reduced availability of informal care support – place 
strain on the provision of LTC services and has led to questioning of the 
financial sustainability of LTC. Financial coverage for LTC is far less developed 
and more recently formalised into social security legislation, compared to other 
policy areas. Support is often provided subject to means and needs tests, which 
has given rise to concerns over catastrophic care costs faced by certain users. It 
is fair to say that LTC currently stands at the forefront of health care and social 
protection debates in Europe, in particular given the fiscal austerity 
experienced in several countries in recent years (OECD, 2011).  
The definition of entitlements to LTC services or support has proven to be a 
difficult and lengthy process in many European countries. The understanding 
                                                 
 1 Need for LTC is commonly discussed in terms of ADLs, “Activities of Daily Living”, and IADLs, 
“Instrumental Activities of Daily Living”. 
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of the conditions under which reform may take place is at its infancy. While in 
some countries reforms to expand LTC financing have moved beyond the 
‘public debate stage’, or even governmental commission, the scope of such 
reforms has often narrowed substantially during its implementation, if not 
failing completely (Riedel and Kraus, 2011; Costa-Font, 2010b). In some cases, 
the entitlement has been significantly watered down after implementation, 
such as the Spanish reduction in LTC support of 25% amidst the economic 
downturn in 2012 (Costa-Font et al., 2016a). An essential constraint to the 
expansion of public LTC coverage2 has been ensuring, jointly, short-term cost-
containment and longer-term financial sustainability, in addition to securing 
public support. Existing research has not given much attention to the 
conditions that pave the way for LTC reform, and in particular coverage 
expansion that is financially sustainable.  
This paper adds to the literature by introducing the concept of ‘implicit 
partnerships’ (IPs) as a way of understanding the program design mechanisms 
behind the expansion or sustaining of public LTC coverage. We discuss its 
definition below in more detail, but briefly ‘implicit partnerships’ can be 
understood as implicit financial agreements whereby reform arrangements 
involve the co-participation in the financing of LTC of different public 
stakeholders (central, regional or local), in addition to, or conditional on, 
contributions of private stakeholders such as users, relatives or the community. 
The latter contribution can be in the form of time devoted to informal care (and 
                                                 
 2 We use the term coverage to denote both financial and provision related generosity of the LTC system. For instance, both the share of those with need that indeed receives public services (note 
that informal care is often counted as ‘unmet need’) and once a user is receiving services – what proportion of the cost is covered. The latter can be thought of as the individual intensity of provision relative to the total cost. 
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hence not to producing rents from employment) or money, such as users’ fees 
or cost sharing (co-payments or deductible) to pay for personal care.  
We contribute as follows: first, we argue that the IP concept enables us to 
interpret the variation of LTC financial entitlements in European countries. The 
implicit partnership notion aligns with key values of many European welfare 
systems; collaboration, co-production and the importance of welfare policy in 
electoral politics, and can be seen as a facilitating condition for European LTC 
reform. Second, we report evidence suggesting that attitudes towards care is 
consistent with the type of implicit partnership model observed in each 
country. To do so, we compare a set of countries, heterogeneous in reform 
trajectories, which represent the different welfare state regimes in Europe. The 
sample includes cases of LTC coverage expansion (Germany, France and 
Spain), retrenchment (Netherlands and Sweden) and stability (England and 
Italy). We draw on academic and documentary evidence to analyse reform 
trajectories alongside quantitative survey data from the European Social 
Survey which captures public preferences for the organisation of LTC services. 
The latter is important insofar as supportive public attitudes have been found 
to open up opportunities for reform (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003).  
Evidence from the set of European countries examined is consistent with the 
development of two forms of IPs; namely ‘implicit user partnerships’, where 
the policy focus is on cost-sharing of formal services, generally at home; and 
‘implicit caregiver partnerships’ where the policy focus is on incentivising and 
supporting informal care provision through cash-for-care schemes or higher 
reliance on cash benefits as a means to sustaining or expanding coverage of 
LTC financing. We further find that the type of IP in each the countries of our 
sample tallies with domestic public opinion favouring formal relative to 
informal care, i.e. the level of familism (Leitner, 2003).  
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The paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses the characteristics 
and challenges to LTC reform and the following defines the concept of ‘implicit 
partnerships’. Section three provides the main features of reform in the selected 
European countries, linking to the types of IP previously defined. Section four 
reports and discusses the quantitative evidence of public opinion data and 
discusses the relation with the typologies of IP in each of the countries. Section 
five provides a concluding discussion.  
 
Reform and long-term care coverage  
 
Welfare reforms, taking place in the current era of permanent austerity, usually 
either preserve the status quo, or encompass the retrenchment of public 
financing or the production of welfare services (Pierson, 2001). There is an 
extensive literature (see for example Korpi and Palme, 2003) on the drivers of 
social protection reforms which acknowledge the fact that governments face a 
range of financial and social constraints when seeking to expand public 
funding and coverage of services. Accordingly, in the case of LTC, the main 
constraint to expanding the coverage is financial sustainability (OECD, 2011). 
This is the case insofar as universal coverage, involving some form of 
entitlement, is very costly (Lave, 1985). The underdeveloped state of LTC 
coverage in many European countries makes financial sustainability an 
important concern to weigh against the increasing demand for LTC, 
underpinned by demographic and labour market change and the loosening of 
family ties (Costa-Font, 2010a). Finally, an emphasis on financial sustainability 
has led to a Europe-wide policy approach of limiting the expansion of 
residential care and instead favouring home based care, including incentives 
for family involvement in the provision and organisation of care. 
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Public insurance expansion is likewise constrained by individuals’ myopia 
with respect to the risk of developing needs for LTC services in the future, and 
hence taking it into account when making electoral choices. This behavioural 
aspect includes some degree of denial of potential future health problems or 
frailty, and a disinterest in reform related to insuring against these types of 
risks (Frank, 2012). This also influences the perception of the relative 
importance of LTC reform, and the appropriate level of expenditure relative to 
other social expenditures (OECD, 2011). Hence, ultimately the expansion of 
LTC entitlements becomes a political decision driven by the willingness of 
citizens (potential future users) to direct tax revenue towards LTC, and 
possibly accepts future tax increases.  
Another constraint to reform lies in the risk of moral hazard in relation to 
uptake of LTC benefits. This is mainly prevalent when LTC is provided in the 
shape of cash benefits, as is the case in several of the countries we discuss 
below. The ‘woodwork effect’ denotes the situation when individuals who 
were previously eligible, but not claiming support, begin to enrol when the 
type and accessibility of LTC provision or payments become more attractive 
(Pauly, 2004; Eiken et al., 2013). This is often the case with cash payments, as 
many LTC users in fact prefer informal care to receiving formal services, and 
would not accept services in kind, while finding cash payments acceptable 
(Chappell and Blandford, 1991).  
On the other hand, one of the most important motivations for reform lies in the 
inefficiencies an underdeveloped or underfunded LTC system brings. Indeed, 
limited health and long-term care integration and lack of LTC services affect 
the efficiency of health services. Similarly, the contrasting entitlements between 
health and long-term care and poorly funded and managed LTC has huge spill-
over costs onto health care, for example due to prolonged hospitalisation 
Financial Long Term Care Entitlements in Europe 
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(Costa-Font et al., 2016). The integration issue can both constrain LTC reform – 
if it is allowed to eat into health spending without too much issue – or, serve as 
an impetus for reform – where it is clear that underfunding of LTC leads to 
inefficient use of resources in the health service (Costa-Font et al., 2016b).  
The expansion of LTC entitlements does occur even given the constraints 
discussed above. We argue that these constrains alone do not necessarily 
impede reform, if coverage is expanded alongside the introduction of cost 
sharing schemes, forming implicit partnerships. Such cost sharing can either 
take the form of co-payments at the point of use (the cost of which could be 
privately insured) and/or subsidies for families to take on caregiving in 
exchange for some public financial support. Nevertheless, coverage expansion 
has relied on the key characteristics of an implicit partnership: the involvement 
of the individual and the family in the responsibility for financing, provision, 
and the organisation of care. 
 
Defining implicit partnership types 
A set of conditions or characteristics are here defined and we argue that these, 
taken together, suggest that what we see can be usefully defined as an implicit 
partnership (IP) facilitating LTC coverage reform. Unlike explicit partnerships 
where involved stakeholders have some say, in the case of implicit partnerships 
this is by far not the case (e.g., in all European countries families are providing 
the bulk of care, also in so-called 'universalist' systems).  This is the partial 
nature of LTC coverage (or what it is sometimes referred as the 'mixed economy 
of care'): the private (meaning family and not commercial) component 
participates either as co-financing or co-producing, importantly, however, 
without a clear formalisation of duties and cost-bearing ex ante. IPs take the 
Joan Costa Font and Valentina Zigante 
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shape of a “silent agreement” between government and society regarding the 
funding and provision of LTC.  
The implicit partnership concept is particularly useful for understanding 
public financing of LTC when it is contrasted with alternative funding models 
such as ‘explicit (financial) partnership’ models prevalent, for example, in the 
US. ‘Explicit partnerships’ can contract an expansion of individuals’ 
contributions to newly funded care costs with the guarantee that the public 
sector will cover the remaining costs, and have been debated in many countries 
(see for example Wanless and Forder (2006) on England, and Doty et al. (2015) 
on France). Benefits include clarity of the relative responsibility of the citizen 
and the state in relation to the financing of LTC and potentially opens up for a 
stronger role of private insurance (and increased supply of insurance 
products). In the US the LTC Partnership program is such that Medicaid funds 
LTC costs above and beyond the coverage of private long-term care insurance 
that tends to be equivalent to the beneficiaries’ assets (Bergquist et al., 2015). 
The long-term care partnership (LTCP) program was an initiative designed to 
encourage middle-class individuals to purchase private long-term care 
insurance to cover at least the non-catastrophic costs of LTSS. This formal 
partnership was designed with the purpose to reduce cost for the state by 
ensuring that individuals where better insured.   
In Europe, the explicit partnership approach has never moved beyond the 
debate stage. For example, the Wanless report (see Wanless and Forder, 2006) 
argued that the best approach for England would be a partnership model, 
including a role for private insurance. The later Dilnot commission produced 
recommendations designed to produce a status quo in English LTC that 
facilitated partnerships with private insurance to cover the, under the Dilnot 
proposal, clearly defined, private share of LTC expenditure (Dilnot, 2011). 
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Similarly, in France under previous leadership an explicit public/private 
partnership in LTC was debated. In recent years, however, no progress has 
been made and there appears to be little political interest. Going forward, there 
is little prospect of an explicit coordinated strategy in France (Doty et al., 2015). 
The first condition supporting the IP hypothesis is the ‘partial universalism’ of 
public LTC coverage across Europe. In both residual (means tested access to 
care) and universal systems, either families or users themselves are expected to 
contribute time or money towards the financing of any care needed. We define 
IPs built around a reliance on cost-sharing, predominantly through co-
payments required by users, as “implicit user partnerships”. These rely on the 
willingness of users to pay at the point of use, but also, significantly, a lack of 
public support and political will to make the financing of LTC explicit, for 
example by creating insurance systems designed to account for co-payments.  
Implicit partnership arrangements also take place when relatives or members 
of the community deliver care themselves, instead of users paying for care. We 
define these as ‘implicit caregiver partnerships’. Informal carers allocate time 
away from other, paid or unpaid, duties such as employment, education or 
child care, and into caregiving. The reliance on family care can be explained by 
a number of factors: needs tested formal care tends to only address substantial 
needs; quality of formal services is often perceived to be low; accessibility of 
alternative sources of support can be an issue; and traditionally support for 
social care in most European countries has been irregular (Leitner, 2003). Given 
the generally lower technical requirements of LTC provision, users’ preferences 
are more likely to influence the final service outcomes compared to health care 
services. Research has found that most users and caregivers3 have a preference 
                                                 
 3 Nonetheless, there is some evidence suggesting negative impacts of caregiving on carers (Smith et al., 2014).   
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for informal care over formal services (Chappell and Blandford, 1991). The co-
production of care services by informal caregivers is further incentivised 
through cash-for-care or cash benefit schemes, which have become 
commonplace under the ‘personalisation’ agenda (Glendinning et al., 2008). 
Ultimately, cash-for-care payments help keep users at home and some of the 
rationale for its implementation lies in that they bring significant savings, 
compared to subsidising community care (Da Roit and Le Bihan, 2010, 2015). 
 
Implicit caregiver and user partnerships: the evidence 
This section traces the broad reform trajectories and compares the LTC systems 
of seven European countries:  England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Historically two generalised models of LTC have 
been discernible in Europe: a universal model (coverage above 20%) such as in 
Scandinavia (and the Netherlands); and a residual model where coverage were 
generally considerably lower (below 10%) and where reliance on family care 
and a heavier reliance on other health services was common, found in 
continental and Southern Europe. LTC models further range from highly 
integrated systems reliant on public provision with limited private alternatives, 
to systems with considerable family involvement together with a fragmented 
and residual public system (Lundsgaard, 2005).  
Sweden represents an ‘old‘ LTC system, established in the 1940s, with tax 
funded universal coverage and a reliance on the state as the main provider of 
care (Karlsson et al., 2010). In later years Sweden has however experimented 
extensively with privatised provision of care and choice for users, as well as 
increased levels of co-payments (Blomqvist, 2004). Similarly, the Netherlands 
has a universal LTC system established as early as the 1960s. Care is, however, 
Financial Long Term Care Entitlements in Europe 
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organised through social insurance funds and is mainly channelled towards 
formal nursing care or residential care homes but with users’ autonomy over 
the organisation of care as a guiding principle. As of 2015, a major LTC reform 
is taking place with the purpose of containing expenditure, in which a shift 
from residential to non-residential care is an integral aspect (Maarse and 
Jeurissen, 2016).  
In contrast, Italy and Spain represent the other extreme in terms of expenditure 
and public involvement, characterised by low expenditure and care largely 
provided informally by family, friends and relatives, complemented by 
predominantly publicly funded institutional care (Costa-Font, 2010b). In Spain 
the 2007 Dependency Bill reform expanded public coverage universally, 
subject to a needs test, with in-kind formal care provision, as well as a 
caregiving allowance. The central and regional government funds two thirds 
of expenditure and users the remainder (Costa-Font et al, 2016).  This LTC 
system design mimicked the German scheme instigated in 1994 (see Rothgang, 
2010). However, in 2012, as part of widespread budget cuts, the LTC subsidy 
was slashed between 15-25% (Costa-Font et al., 2016).  
Germany and England represent the middle ground in terms of public 
resources spent on LTC; with a significant share supporting informal carers. 
The devolution of the British political system has, however, resulted in 
diverging LTC systems: the Scottish system provides free home care and 
subsidies for nursing home care, whereas in England strict means testing is 
applied for all services (Comas-Herrera et al., 2010). The extension of means 
testing to some form of universal entitlement has been much debated in 
England, where catastrophic costs are faced by middle income households in 
Joan Costa Font and Valentina Zigante 
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case of substantial and prolonged care needs.4 The German system on the other 
hand offers a universal entitlement channelled through social insurance funds. 
A needs test restricts access, and the benefit levels have been criticised for being 
insufficient. Means tested social assistance plays a substantial role for people 
who are not able to meet the required co-payments (Rothgang, 2010).  
Finally, the French LTC system is distinct from the others in its mix of private 
and public care provision. The French model is based on cash payments with 
complementary insurance that encompasses low premiums and high uptake 
(Doty et al., 2015). The fact that the main LTC scheme, the APA 
(Allocation Personalisee d'Autonomie), a caregiving cash allowance, is means 
tested, has led to a demand for complementary insurance to cover the share of 
care not publicly funded. What sets France apart from the other countries is 
that there is a supply of private insurance, widely available through 
employment sponsored insurance policies. Even though its share of LTC 
expenditure is low, private insurance covered as much as 11% of the French 
population in 2012 (Doty et al., 2015). 
Table 1 summarises the diversity of the LTC systems surveyed. Particularly in 
terms of expenditure as a proportion of GDP and the comprehensiveness of the 
coverage, we note marked differences. Total LTC spending is the highest in the 
Netherlands and Sweden (more than 3.5% of GDP), and the lowest in the 
Mediterranean countries. The level of coverage follows the same pattern. It 
should be noted that our estimates of coverage do not include cash benefits, in 
 
 
                                                 
 4 The current English means-tested system implies a possible loss of up to 80% of total wealth for individuals within certain wealth segments (Dilnot, 2011). 
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Table 1. Overview of institutional setting of the LTC systems 
 Entitlement Expenditure (% of GDP 2010) Population coverage/65+ Financing Cost-sharing 
France Universal 1.27 12.1% (inst+home) Decentralised (many actors – complex flows) 
 Income related – from 0-80% of total cost.  
Germany Universal 1.44 11.3% Mandatory social health insurance scheme 
LTCI benefits are capped – user tops up, or means-tested social assistance supports. 
Italy Universal 1.91 (1) 7.9% (inst+home) Tax funded, fragmented (central, regional, local) 
 Substantial income related co-payments 
– up to 100% of cost.  
Netherlands Universal 4.1 19.6% (inst+home) Mandatory social health insurance scheme 
 Co-payments by user related to income  
Spain Universal 1.11 10.2% (inst+home+telecare) Mandatory central government 
Co-payments by user related to income (up to 90% of cost) reserved amount 
Sweden Universal 3.65 16.6% (inst+home) Decentralised Co-payments by user related to income. Reserved amount  
England Means-tested  1.97 (1) 
11.8% (inst+home+DP/PB) 7.19% (inst+home) Decentralised 
Means-tested co-payments up to 100% of cost. 
  Note: Year: Expenditure from 2012.  Sources: OECD Health Data 2010 (October 2010), ANCIEN study country reports. (1) Year 2010. ‘Inst’ refers to institutional care, ‘home’ refers to home care, 
and ‘telecare’ refers to telecare. 
 
order to be comparable and to avoid double counting users. These play a 
substantial role in many of the systems, for example in England, where 
universal disability benefits such as attendance allowance and disability living 
allowance cover over 27% of the population aged 65 and above. There are 
similar cash benefits in Italy (the IDA) which cover 12% of the elderly 
population, with the important distinction that they form an integral part of the 
public financing of care (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012). 
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As anticipated, we find that in all of the countries examined, users are expected 
to share the costs of care, to varying degrees. Sweden and Spain operate 
systems of income-related co-payments up to thresholds defined by a ‘reserved 
amount’, each month after care payments. In all the systems except for Italy 
and England, some of the care costs are covered for all individuals, regardless 
of income. However, it is not uncommon that users pay a large proportion of 
care cost themselves, in all countries.  
Policies supporting family care are common, however distinct in type, across 
the countries. A noteworthy recent trend is cash-for-care schemes, which allow 
the user to purchase, or informally source, the care package desired. Cash-for-
care schemes are also seen as attempts to enable people, who otherwise do not 
have means, to choose and control the services they need (Clarke et al., 2007; 
Ferguson, 2007; Stevens et al., 2011; Beresford, 2014). The extent and trajectory 
of cash-for-care type schemes can be argued to illustrate the extent to which 
family care is seen as an essential LTC provision, and an illustration of ‘implicit 
caregiver partnerships’. Table 2 outlines the cash-for-care schemes of the 
countries in our sample. 
The German approach universally offers a choice between formal care or cash 
payments as part of the national LTCI, while in the English LTC system, direct 
payments and personal budgets are intended to be offered to all users meeting 
the means test (Glendinning et al., 2008). In both systems, the cash payments 
can be used to fund continuous informal caregiving, as well as one-off 
payments for example for training. Cash-for-care was instituted in France in 
2002 through the APA, however with strict restrictions on how the cash benefit 
is spent (Le Bihan and Martin, 2010; Doty et al., 2015). In Sweden, cash 
payments play a smaller role and are generally focused on young disabled 
rather than on the elderly with care needs (Sundström et al., 2002). 
Financial Long Term Care Entitlements in Europe 
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Table 2. Overview of LTC cash for care schemes and their role as part of LTC financing.  
Cash-for-care 
scheme 
Initial policy 
setting 
Cash/ in 
kind 
(service) 
Percentage 
covered in 
2011 
Size of 
benefits 
Family 
versus state 
care 
Germany Social LTCI Foundation of LTC policy Cash or in kind services 11 level 1: €215 level 2: €420 level 3: €675 Family 
France l'allocation personnalisée d'autonomie (APA)  
Foundation of LTC policy Cash for care 7.8 (on population 60+) Average amount: €494/month Mixed/State 
Italy Indennità di accompagna-mento Core position within implicit LTC policy Cash 10 Flat-rate payment, 2009: €472 Family  
Spain Sistema para al autonomía y la atención a la dependencia (SAAD)  
Foundation of LTC policy Cash or in kind services 3.3 200-500 euro per month Family /Mixed 
Netherlands Attendance allowance Flexibility of established LTC policy Cash or in kind services 1.4 Average budget, 2006: €11,500/year State/ professionals 
Sweden Decentralised attendance allowance Flexibility of established LTC policy Cash  0.1 487/month State/ professionals 
UK Individual budgets Flexibility of established LTC policy Cash 0.5 Depending on need Mixed/State Sources:  ANCIEN study country reports and OECD Health data and documentation. 
 The review of the seven systems illustrates how implicit partnerships have 
developed in different formats across Europe. Well-established systems such 
as Sweden and the Netherlands still face considerable financial sustainability 
pressures and employ cost-sharing schemes to mediate demand for care. These 
systems are reverting from more expensive institutional care to cheaper 
community care alternatives such as home care provision, provided mainly by 
professional carers but also, to an increasing degree, by informal carers 
(Sundström et al., 2002; Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). These can be seen as 
implicit user partnerships, where responsibility for care is shifted to the user in 
order to maintain or expand coverage of LTC funding.  In contrast, in newly 
established systems such as Spain and Italy, we find considerable use of cash-
Joan Costa Font and Valentina Zigante 
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based caregiving allowances, relying on the family as the main caring agent, 
which could be seen as a strategy to transfer financial responsibility. In Italy, 
political debates over the financial sustainability of LTC have arisen from time 
to time, but have to date not led to reform (Tediosi and Gabriele, 2010). Spain 
also operates a system of co-payments accounting for 25 per cent of community 
care and 75 per cent of residential care spending (Costa-Font and Patxot, 2005). 
We view these familistic LTC systems as implicit caregiver partnerships, given 
that the main approach to maintaining and expanding coverage is through 
incentives and support for caregivers. France is a particular case, where the 
focus has traditionally been on formally provided care, in institutions or at 
home. The relatively large share of private insurance can be seen as a response 
to the limited benefits and income related means test structure of the APA 
rather than driven by a demand for private insurance per se, or an explicit 
partnership structure (Doty et al., 2015; Da Roit and Le Bihan, 2010). France 
hence forms another example of an implicit user partnership given its 
substantial reliance on co-payments and remaining focus on formal care. 
Similarly, Germany has a particularly high proportion of co-payments (see 
Table 1) and due to capping of insurance entitlements, private co-payments 
and means-tested social assistance play an important role in the financing of in 
particular nursing home care, where around 30% of all residents receive social 
assistance to help cover co-payments (Rothgang, 2010). Voluntary private LTC 
insurance plays a minor role in covering co-payments; in 2009, about 3.5% of 
the German population aged 40 and over held a (mainly) indemnity policy 
(OECD, 2011). 
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Public preferences for long-term care provision and 
financing 
The previous section provided some evidence on the association between 
European coverage reforms and the characteristics of ‘implicit partnerships’, 
although with noteworthy cross-country variation. Given that in addition to 
financial constraints, one can argue that there are social constraints to LTC 
reform, we here consider the alignment of preferences of the public with the 
state LTC financing and provision structures. In this section we use 
Eurobarometer survey data (nr. 67.3 from 2007), which provides a 
representative sample of peoples’ attitudes towards LTC financing and 
provision in the countries of our sample.  
In Table 3 attitudes in relation to three facets of the LTC system are reported: 
the role of family care; the role of public finance and provision; and the role of 
private financing. Particularly in relation to the role of family responsibility, 
there are marked cross-country differences. For example, the variation between 
the lowest rate of support for the care by relatives (even if it represents a 
sacrifice for the carer), found among the Swedish respondents (7.3%), and the 
substantial support for such care (52%) amongst Italian respondents is striking. 
This suggests that the type of implicit partnership that can be relied on in one 
country is not necessarily suitable in another. Similar patterns emerge when we 
investigate attitudes towards children’s responsibility to help pay for their 
parents’ care if needed. The latter explains why in countries like Sweden, we 
tend to observe an “implicit user partnership” whilst in a country like Italy one 
would instead expect to identify an “implicit caregiver partnership”.  
There is much less variation in the views on the role of the state in the financing 
and provision of services. Generally speaking, the support for state 
intervention is strong. On average 86% support the responsibility of the state 
Joan Costa Font and Valentina Zigante 
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to provide care to those in need and to, both financially and in terms of respite 
time, support informal caregivers. This is consistent with the fact that the 
countries examined here offer some level of support, and in the countries that 
have not yet had major reform, proposals attempt to overcome the reliance on 
means-tested care and move towards a universal entitlement with a significant 
cost sharing or family involvement.  
Finally, the views on the role of private financing, such as private insurance, 
similarly appear to be system specific. Individual financial responsibility is not 
seen to stretch as far as selling or borrowing against, the user’s home (house or 
flat). Spain is the only outlier in this category, in part explained by the housing 
bubble at the time of the interview, which overwhelmingly benefited older 
individuals. The views on user payments hence seems to match up well with 
the mainly partial co-payments systems outlined in Table 1, where certain 
countries employ ‘reserve income’ schemes and others combine social 
assistance support where the user cannot meet co-payments.    
This brief dive into public preferences illustrated how the idea of implicit 
partnerships and the two types, user and caregiver partnerships, seems to 
match, or be supported by the public in the respective countries.
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Table 3. Attitudes to financing and provision of LTC – % agreeing with statements   France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain UK Sweden Average 
Family responsibility 
Children should pay for the care of their 
parents if their parents’ income is not sufficient 49% 30% 71% 21% 74% 26% 14% 40% Care should be provided by close relatives of the dependent person, even if that means that they have to sacrifice their career to some extent 18% 34% 52% 12% 44% 32% 7% 29% 
Role of public finance and provision 
Public authorities should provide appropriate home care and\ or institutional care for elderly people in need 97% 93% 92% 96% 98% 97% 98% 96% The state should pay an income to those who have to give up working or reduce their working time to care for a dependent person 88% 91% 87% 87% 95% 95% 86% 90% From time to time, the state should pay for professional carers to take over from family carers so that family carers can take a break 92% 96% 88% 94% 96% 97% 97% 94% 
Role of private financing 
Every individual should be obliged to contribute to an insurance scheme that will finance care if and when it is needed 79% 84% 57% 84% 73% 66% 58% 72% If a person becomes dependent and cannot pay for care from their own income, their flat or house should be sold or borrowed against to pay for care 27% 29% 27% 21% 39% 19% 16% 26% Note: Question QA8: For each of the following statements regarding the care of the elderly, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree: “Totally agree”, 
“Tend to agree”, “Tend to disagree”, “Totally disagree” and “Don’t Know”.  The percentage selecting categories “Totally agree” and “Tend to agree” have been summarised in the table and rounded. Source: Eurobarometer survey 2007.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has set out to examine one potential explanation for LTC coverage 
expansion (or maintenance) in Europe, namely, the development of what we 
have conceptualised as ‘implicit partnerships’. These ‘silent agreements’ 
encompass a partial extension of public LTC coverage, shared between 
caregivers, users and the state. The advantage of this strategy with respect to 
explicit partnerships arrangements is that it avoids a country-wide discussion 
centred on the potentially divisive matter of the future of the family and the 
limits of public intervention in funding long-term care. We have argued that 
these partnerships rely predominantly on support from either the caregiver or 
the user. They can hence take the form of either an ‘implicit caregiver 
partnership’ or an ‘implicit user partnership’. The former is denoted by 
subsidies to incentivize and support informal, or family, provision of LTC, and 
the latter by the subsidy of in-kind services provided externally by market or 
public services, subject to means testing and with a significant cost sharing 
element to ensure fiscal sustainability and counteract moral hazard.  
Drawing on both institutional analysis of LTC system developments and 
quantitative analysis of European survey data, we have documented evidence 
indicating that countries that have expanded coverage have done so by 
introducing or changing pre-existing cost sharing schemes and hence 
developing ‘implicit user partnerships’, or subsidising informal caregiving and 
hence developing ‘implicit caregiving partnerships’, or both. The same applies 
in the reverse situation, in which governments have relied on implicit 
partnerships when restricting funding, while maintaining at least theoretical 
coverage, through changes to needs or means tests, such as in Sweden and 
England. Whether one or the other partnership type develops seems to have 
depended to a certain extent on path dependency of reform as well as on the 
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national context and the attitudes towards informal care versus in-kind 
services, i.e. the level of familism (Costa-Font, 2010a, Saraceno and Keck, 2010). 
These considerations might in turn have slowed down the expansion of public 
LTC coverage, compared to other social services. 
When setting the idea of implicit partnerships in the broader reform debate, it 
is worth noting that the reform and expansion of public long-term care funding 
and coverage is not without problems. The modification of the LTC 
entitlement, such as a move from means tested to universal access, may have 
equity impacts.  Hence, the effect of new entitlement design on access to care 
by those at the bottom of the income distribution should be carefully 
considered in designing new implicit partnerships. 
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